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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEw
directing it to choose between the lex loci delicti or the lex
loci mortis.13
GERALD F. JOHANSEN
CONTEMPT - DIRECT CONTEMPT - RIGHT OF THE COURT
TO PUNISH SUMMARILY - The defendant, who had continually
interrupted the court in its attempt to examine a witness, was
charged with direct contempt of court and sentenced to
twenty days in jail. The judge sentenced the defendant on the
day after the trial, refusing to allow the defendant to explain
his actions. The United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, held, one judge dissenting, that the court had power
to convict the defendant for direct contempt under Rule 42a
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure., The dissent
argued that no one is to be punished under our laws without
the opportunity to be heard. United States v. Galante and
Mirra, 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962).
The power of courts over contempt is practically plenary
and in the absence of constitutional or valid statutory restric-
tions, the exercise of such power should not be questioned by
any tribunal. 2 This power is established to protect courts of
justice and to maintain their dignity and authority.3 However,
the power to punish for direct contempt is not arbitrary. It
must be exercised in accordance with the rules of procedure
established by the courts or prescribed by statute.4 Punish-
ment of contempt committed in the presence of the court is
within the court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless the discretion is abused. 5 However, the lack
13. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
Wherein the Court applied the substantive law of the forum, the plaintiff's
domicile, rather that the law of the place of injury, lex locus delietus, for
the reason that it was repugnant to the public policy of the forum-state
to limit wrongful death recovery to the amount prescribed by the lex locus
delietus. (Indicative of a trend to give more recognition to the law of the
state whose interests are most affected); See generally Morris, The Proper
Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L Rev. 881 (1951); (Critical attack upon the in-
flexibility of the "Last event" doctrine); Note, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 133
(1959); Note, 6 N.Y.L.F. 484 (1960).
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 (a); "CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-SUMMARY DIS-
POSITION-A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge
certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order for
contempt shall be signed by the judge and entered of record."
2. State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930).
3. Ibid.
4. State ex rel. Rankin v. District Court of First Judicial District,
58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 772 (1920).
5. United States v. Bollenback, 125 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1938).
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of statutory limitations on the District Court's power to
sentence for criminal contempt has led the United States
Supreme Court to hold that the sentence is subject to review
on appeal.6
Every judge who presides over a court of law has the
power to punish for contempt.7 Where the contempt is com-
mitted in open court it may be adjudged and punished sum-
marily on the court's knowledge of the facts. s The failure to
present a formal complaint or give the contemnor an oppor-
tunity to defend does not violate due process of law; 9 and
since the contemnor is already in court, neither written
charges nor process is required.10 Summary punishment may
be given without notice, affidavit, hearing or trial by jury."
An incomplete petition charging contempt is immaterial since
no petition is necessary,' 2 providing the action to punish is
taken within a reasonable time after the trial.13 If not, process
is required.1
4
North Dakota holds that a criminal contempt committed
within the personal knowledge and observation of the presid-
ing judge can be punished summarily without the use of
pleadings or evidence other than the judge's senses.15 North
Dakota has a statutory limitation for punishment of criminal
contempt - a fine not to exceed $250.00 or 30 days in a
county jail or both. 16
The minority viewpoint on the power to punish summarily
considers that even though the court has the power to punish
summarily, the defendant still has all the rights given him
by law.' One convicted of criminal contempt should be ac-
6. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
7. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (dictum).
8. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) (dictum); Ex parte Morris, 252
Ala. 551, 42 So. 2d 17 (1949).
9. Rubin v. State, 192 Wis. 1, 211 N.W. 926 (1927).
10. Garland v. State, 99 Ga. 826, 110 S.E.2d 143 (1959); State ex rel. Ran-
Kin v. District Court of First Judicial District, 58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 772
(1920).
11. Shotkin v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 124 Colo. 141, 235 P.2d
990 (1951); See In re Manufacturers Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948 (6th Cir.
1952).
12. In re Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. 174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1936).
13. Curran v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. 258, 236 Pac. 975 (1925).
14. Shibley v. United States, 236 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956).
15. State v. Root, 5 N.D. 487, 67 N.W. 590 (1896).
16. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-10-02 (1961).
17. Ev parte Sullivan, 10 Okia, Crim. 465, 138 Pac. 815 (1914).
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corded the same orderly trial as any other defendant.18
It is submitted that the power given courts to punish for
a direct contempt is an irregularity in our system that
guarantees due process of law. It seems to permit punishment
without actual due process of law. The summary punishment
power is given to the courts because they have already heard
the facts that would be brought out in the trial for contempt
and it enables the courts to preserve their existence and power.
The exercise of the formalities of law would not be an expe-
dient means of handling cases of direct contempt. The defend-
ant does not lose his rights; justice is afforded the defendant
by appeal if he feels the sentence received is excessive for the
contempt he has committed, or that the court has abused its
discretion.
CONRAD GREICAR
CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT OF TRADE OR COMPETITION IN
TRADE - CONSTRUCTION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS - The
Plaintiff, a partnership, sought to enjoin the defendant, an
ex-partner, from practicing medicine in violation of a restric-
'ive convenant entered into between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant in a contract for employment. The contract expressly
stated that should the defendant terminate his employment
with the plaintiff, he would refrain from practicing medicine
or surgery within a 25 mile radius for three years. Defendant
subsequently left the plaintiff's employ and soon thereafter
opened a practice within the area mentioned in the contract.
The Supreme Court of Iowa held, two judges dissenting,
that the injunction should be granted since the covenant
imposed restrictions which were reasonable as to time and
area and not in conflict with public policy.
The dissent considered the restriction as to area to be un-
reasonable, since there were few orthopedic surgeons practic-
ing within the heavily populated 25 mile radius, and therefore
the restriction was greater than necessary to protect the
plaintiff. Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa
1962).
Injunctive relief is granted not as an absolute right, but
18. People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923).
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